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CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS' VOTING AGREEMENTS-DRAFTING PRECAU'fIONs-According to most authority shareholders may
make a.legal and enforceable contract to vote their shares as a unit for
the election of directors. Such contracts, it is generally agreed, are valid
if they do not limit the discretio_n of directors, contemplate fraud, violate any statutory, constitutional, by-law, or charter provision, or operate to oppress other stockholders.1 A few courts, however, remain committed to the outmoded doctrine that each shareholder owes a duty to
every other shareholder to vote his own stock, and that therefore pooling agreements are invalid per se.2 Further comment on the fallacy of
maintaining such a position in view of modern business conditions is not
I

1 Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55
N.E. 809 (1900); Weber v. Della Mountain Min. Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 P. 441
(1908); White v. Snell, 35 Utah 434, 100 P. 927 (1909); Winsor v. Common"
wealth Coal Co., 63 Wash. 62, 114 P. 908 (1911); Thompson v. Thompson, 279 Ill.
54, 116 N.E. 648 (1917); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918);
In re Pittock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 P. 633 (1921); Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich.
547, 242 N.W. 747 (1932); Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987,. 175 S. 642
(1937); Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36 A. (-2d) 266 (1944); Hart v.
Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W. (2d) 175, 24 N.W. (2d) 41 (1946); Rogers, "Pooling
Agreements Among Stockholders," 19 YALE L. J. 345 (1910) ;-Wormser, "The Legal"
ity of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements," 18 Cot. L. REv. 123
(1918); 66 U. S. L. REv. 562 (1932); 3 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 640 (1936); 2
THOMPSON CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., § 1001 (1927); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoR"
PORATION, perm., ed., § 2064 ( I 93 I); 13 AM. JuR., Corporations, § 500; I 8 C.J.S.
Corporations,§ 551j BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS rev. ed., § 183 (1946); 71 A.L.R.
1289 (1931).
2 Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917); Morel v. Hoge,
130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908); see Roberts v. Whitson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
188 S.W. (2d) 875 at 878.
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a part of this writing, as the point has been thoroughly covered in a
number of legal articles and judicial opinions.3
It has frequently been asserted by writers that the validity or invalidity of a voting agreement depends upon whether the object thereby sought to be attained is deemed worthy or unworthy by the court.4
From this it might appear that there is no problem in enforcing such
an agreement if its purpose is legal, but an examination of the cases reveals that even though a particular agreement is for a proper purpose,
when a breach or attempted revocation occurs, the innocent party not
infrequently discovers that in practical effect -the agreement is nugatory.11 The object of this comment is to consider some of the problems
in drafting a pooling agreement so that the courts will carry into effect
the vote as provided for in the agreement even though there is an
attempted revocation or breach.
Three cases are given special attention-an early California decision, Smith v. San Francisco and N. P. Ry Co.; 6 a comparatively late
opinion of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Roberts v. Whitson; 7
and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware, Ringling
Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling. 8 These
cases have been singled out because they clearly show the danger of
assuming that so long as the voting contract is for a legal object the
drafter has no problem, and a majority of courts will enforce it. The
agreements involved are similar and at first glance may appear indistinguishable; nevertheless, technical differences in the agreements
brought about contrary results.
·

A. Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co.
Smith and two others purchased stock under an agreement that the
stock should be voted in one block for a period of five years. The vote
was to be determined by ballot among themselves. Smith, contending
the agreement was invalid, attempted to cast his vote separately. The
chairman of the meeting rejected it and counted the vote tendered on
behalf of Smith by the concurring parties. Smith brought a bill in
equity to have tile election set aside. The California Supre1:1e Court rea Finkelstein, "Voting Trust Agreements," 24 MICH, L. REv. 344 (1926);
Burke, "Voting Trusts Currently Observed," 24 MINN. L. REV. 347 (1940); supra,
note 1.
~ 18 C.J.S., Corporations,§ 551 (b), p. 1256; 71 A.L.R. 1289 at 1290 (1931).
11 Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297, 65 N.W. 809 (1895); Gleason v. Earles, 78
Wash. 491, 139 P. 213 (1914); Ringling Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Com. Shows, Inc.
T, Ringling, (Del. 1947) 53 A. (2d) 441; Roberts v. Whitson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
188 S.W. (2d) 875.
6 II5 Cal. 584, 47 P. 582 (1897).
7 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 875.
8 (Del. 1947) 53 A. (2d) 441.
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fused to do so, taking the position that the instrume.nt executed by the
parties was a proxy and authorized the vote in accordance with determination by two of the three parties. The court expressed this view in
these words:
" ••• if it [ the proxy] was made upon a consideration sufficient
to bind the parties to its enforcement, it must be regarded as still
operative.•.• It may be assumed that neither of the parties would
have entered into the transaction, or agreed \lpon the purchase of
the stock, except upon these conditions, and it must be held that
each contributed his money to_ the purchase of the stock upon the
promise made to him by the others. There was thus a sufficient
consideration for the agreement granting the right to vote the
stock. It was in the nature of a power coupled with an interest,
and, being given for valuable consideration, could not be revoked
at the pleasure of either." 9
The important point to note is that the contract did not expressly
provide for a proxy, but the court found an implied proxy, irrevocable
because it was in the "nature of a power coupled with an interest" and
given for valuable consideration. It should also be observed that the
purchase of stock on the basis of the promises, and not the mutual
promises alone, was viewed as the consideration.

B. Roberts v. Whitson
Whitson and two others entered into an agreement to vote their
stock as a block and provided that in case of disagreement the controversy should be submitted to arbitration. Each party was to appoint an
arbitrator, the three to select two more, the majority of the five to
decide the issue involved, after which stockholders were to vote their
stock accordingly. One party repudiated· the agreement and another
declined to appoint an arbitrator as requested by Whitson. Whitson
instituted suit for injunction asking the court to compel compliance
with the agreem·ent. The court held that the voting agreement was revocable· and having been revoked was no longer in force; furthermore,
it viewed the agreement as a derogation of the laws of the state controlling corporations, agaiust public policy, and vojd.
The position taken appears somewhat inconsistent with the following language in the opinion:
". . . While it is true that, absent fraud, proxies and voting
agreements are generally sustained, yet, if not coupled with an in9 Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584 at 599-600, 47 P. 582
(1897).
,
•
,
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terest or based upon consideration deemed valuable in law, are revocable; indeed, according to the weight of authority, an irrevocable proxy or power of attorney to vote stock, if no,t coupled with
an interest, is contrary to public policy." 10
Prior to this statement the court stated that the agreement was not
based upon consideration deemed valuable in law.11
Mutual promises of parties to a contract are generally regarded as
sufficient consideration for each other unless they are unlawful and
therefore constitute no consideration whatever.12 In spite of this fact
no decision has been found, unless it be Ringling Bros.-Barnum and
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. 'V. Ringling, that holds mutual promises
are sufficient consideration for a binding contract to vote stock.
The opinion in the instant case exemplifies a definite hostility toward voting agreements. It leaves doubt as to whether it would be
possible to draft a voting agreement which the Texas Court would enforce. The court's· concern over lack of consideration, or a "power coupled with an interest," may have been one means of disposing of the
case at hand, for there is reason to believe that if faced with an agreement containing what is referred to loosely as a "power coupled with an
interest" or what the court regards as legal consideration, the court
would nullify it by resorting to the antique doctrine that each stockholder owes a duty to every other stockholder to vote his own stock.18
On the other harid it may very well be that objections to the agreement
in the principal case could be obviated by making it a part of a transaction in which other property rights changed, or a part of an agreement
to purchase stock. Such arrangements have been viewed as satisfying the
requirement of legal consideration or something in the nature of a
"power coupled with an interest." 14
,
The object sought by parties to the agreement in the principal case
might have been reached by use of a voting trust. Although policy
arguments relied upon to defeat pooling agreements might be used
with equal persuasion against voting trusts, dictum in a recent Texas
case suggests that a voting trust may be validly entered into between
stockholders of a Texas corporation. 15
10

Roberts v. Whitson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 875 at 878.

11

Id. at 877.

1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., § 103F (1936).
Roberts v. Whitson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (2d) 875 at 878.
14 Infra, note 2 7.
111 Hamblem v. Horwitz-Texan Theatres Co., Inc., (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 162
S.W. (2d) 455 at 457.
12

18

·
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C. Ringling Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.,
v. Ringling
·
Mrs. Ringling and Mrs. Haley, two of three stockholders of defendant corporation, each owning approximately on~-third of the stock,
agreed to act jointly in exercising their voting rights. The agreement
was to be in ~ffect for a period of ten years. In the event that the
parties failed to agree they bound themselves to vote as Mr. Loos, an
arbitrator, should direct. The parties also agreed that each would have
the right of first refusal on the other's stock. There was disagreement
and Mr. Loos ordered both to vote for the directors Mrs. Ringling
favored. Mrs. Haley refused to comply and by her vote succeeded in
installing a different director. Mrs. Ringling brought-suit to enforce
the agreement. The chancellor decreed the election be set aside and the
agreement be specifically performed at a new meeting of the shareholders.16 He viewed the agreement as constituting the willing party
an implied agent, possessing a "power coupled with an interest" to cast
the particular vote. In the words of the chancellor, "a situation very
similar in principle is presented and disposed of in this manner by the
California Court in Smith v. San Francisco and N. P. Ry. Co." 17
The Delaware Supreme Court held the agreement valid but modified the order of the Court of Chancery by directing that upon application of Mrs. Ringling, the injured party, the votes representing Mrs.
Haley's shares should not be counted. Its refusal to enforce the arbitrator's decision was justified on the basis that the agreement did not
empower the arbitrator to carry his directions into effect and that nothing was ~ontained in the agreement, or the actions of the parties, that
could be construed to grant a power in either party to exercise the voting rights of the other. By interpreting the contract in this manner and
not counting Mrs. Haley's votes an unusual result was reached.18 This
case should serve as a warning to the draftsman of pooling agreements
to provide expressly for the power in the parties to vote for each other
and not to depend upon the court to imply such a power.
The Delaware court seemed to take the position that if the pooling
16 Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com. Shows, Inc. (Del. Ch., Newcastle Co. 1946) 49 A. (2d) 603, noted in 60 HARV. L. REV. 651 (1947).
17 Id., 49 A. (2d) 603 at 6u.
18 Mrs. Ringling and Mrs. Haley had 315 shares each and Mr. North had 370
shares. To be sure to elect five of seven directors, regardless of how Mr. North might
vote, the combined votes had to be divided among five different candidates and it was
essential both Mrs. Ringling and Mrs. Haley vote for at least one of the five. When
Mrs. Haley's votes were rejected that left three directors elected by Mrs. Ringling
and three by Mr. North, neither having voted more than three. Mrs. Haley was left
in a position to nullify the effect of the agreement by declining to vote at the next
election and making it possible for Mr. North, owning a few more shares than Mrs.
Ringling, to place four of seven on the board of directors.
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agreement provided for a power' in each party to exercise the voting
rights of the other the mutual promises would be sufficient consideration, and the decision of the arbitrator would be enforced. However,
there are three reasons why a draftsman cannot afford to construe this
decision as meaning that mutual promises of parties to a pooling agreement are legal consideration which will support a power in each party
to exercise the voting rights of the others. First, this portion of the
opinion was dictum. Second, the agreement gave the parties the right
of first refusal in case the other party should sell her shares, and such
a right has been viewed as in the nature of "a power coupled with an
interest," or as the requisite consideration.19 Third, in an earlier :Delaware case the court indicated that a proxy or power to vote which was
granted in a voting contract had to be "coupled with an interest," or the
agreement was revocable. 20
The end sought in the principal case might have been achieved by
setting up a voting trust in accordance with the Delaware Statute authorizing voting trusts. 21 Mrs. Ringling and Mrs. Haley could have
formed a voting trust, appointed their "arbitrator" as a third trustee,
and provided in the trust instrument that all shares would be voted as
determined by the majority of the trustees. 22

D. Drafting a Voting Agreement
In drafting a voting agreement the draftsman should constantly
bear in mind that there remains in many jurisdictions considerable
19

Infra, note 29.
In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch. 398 at 408, 168 A. 82 (1933), "It seems that no
one except a stockholder of record can vote at a corporate election of a Delaware ~orporation unless he be a voting trustee with whom stock has been deposited ••• a fiduciary, • • • a pledger whose -shares have been transferred to the pledgee without power
to vote, or the holder of a valid and unrevoked proxy." The court distinguished a
group of cases, among them Smith v. San Francisco & N.P.R. Co., on the ground
that in those cases the agency authority was coupled with an interest.
21
Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65, § 18, p. 467: "One or more stockholders may
by agreement in writing deposit cap4aI stock of an original issue with or transfer capital stock to any person or persons, or corporation or corporations authorized to act as
trustee, for the purpose of vesting in said person or persons, corporation or corporations,
who may be designated Voting Trustee or Voting Trustees, the right to vote thereon
for any period of time determined by such agreement, not exceeding ten years, upon
the terms and conditions stated in such agreement. Such agreement may contain any
other lawful provisions not inconsistent with said purpose••••"
22
The doctrine of merger of legal and equitable interests should prove no obstacle
in creating such a trust. 2 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 341(h) (1935) "Trustees and
beneficiaries identical. Although the several beneficiaries of a trust become the trustees
of the trust, or the trustees become the beneficiaries, the trust is not terminated." See
Illustration 18, p. 1051 for a situation where B, C, and D hold in trust for C and D.
Rankine v. Metzger, 69 App. Div. 264 at 269, 74 N.Y.S. 649 (1902); I BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES,§ 129 (1935); 29 YALE L. J. 97 (1919).
20
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hostility toward such a controlling device.23 · If the objective is merely
to unite votes for the board of directors little difficulty should be experienced with contentions of fraud or illegal purpose. Although
there is no valid reason why the mutual promises of the parties to the
agreement are not sufficient to support it, the draftsman must face the
fact that in most, if not ~ jurisdictions, something 'more is required
to make it irrevocable.
In order to forestall litigation, and to insure enforcement of the
contract in case of breach, the following prec_autions are recommended
regardless of decisions ~hich may appear to make them unnecessary:
(I) The agreement should state fully the legal purpose or purposes for which it is made.24
( 2) The agreement should be created for a reasonable period ot
time. In no case should that period exceed the statutory time limit for
proxies.25 (If the statute provides that all proxies are revocable, resort
should be made to the voting trust or some other means of control.)
(3) Each party should be empowered to-vote the entire block of
stock for the directors selected under the pooling agreement with it expressly stipulated that the power is irrevocable.26
·
( 4) The agreement should spell out a valuable consideration other
than the mutual promises of the parties.27
( 5) When practicable, the parties to the agreement should be
given a property or security interest in the s~ares of the other parties.
Tlie same effect should be had by making the contract a part of a transaction in which other property rights have changed, or a part of an
agreement to purchase shares.28 If it is not feasible to work in any of
these relations, it may well be that providing for a right of :first refusal
in case_ of sale by a party to the agreement would create su~cient inter23 Wormser, "The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements,"
18 CoL. L. REV. 123 (1918); 17 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1932); 3 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
640 (1936).
'
24 Washington and Fulda, "Protective Coloring in Corporation Law," 26 MINN,
L. REV. 824 ( l 942); Burke, ''Voting Trusts Currently Observed," 24 MINN. L. REV.
347 (1940).
25 Simpson v. Nielson, 77 Cal. App. 297, 246 P. 342 (1926); 159 A.L.R. 307
at 312 (1945).
' ·
26 Ringling-Bros. Barnum and Bailey Com. Shows v. Ringling, (Del. Ch., Newcastle Co. 1946) 49 A. (2d) 603, furnishes an excellent example of the advisability of
this provision.
27 Provide the court with a means of sustaining the agreement without breaking
precedent or expressly overruling a prior deciison.
·
28 BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS, § 179, p. 410 (1946); Axe, "Corporate Proxies,"
41 MICH. L. REv. 38 at 52 and 225 at 257 (1942); 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945).
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est to satisfy the requirement of a "power coupled with an interest,"
.and adequate consideration. 29
LeRoy H. Redfern, S.Ed.

29 Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 403, 76 A. 103 (1910); Ringling v. Ringling
Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Com. Shows, (Del. Ch., Newcastle Co. 1946) 49 A. (2d)
603, noted in 60 HARV. L. REV. 651 (1947); 159 A.L.R. 307 (1945).

